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Abstract:　 Local police departments, primarily responsible for protecting its community, have become better
prepared to respond to transnational terrorist threats since September 11, 2001. The effective anti-terrorism measures
implemented by the local law enforcement authorities are noteworthy. This is especially the case with the New York
City Police Department. This paper outlines the International Liaison Program of the department, enumerating many
strengths of the program while dispelling various criticisms of it.
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Introduction
“Extraterritorial law enforcement” is itself a contradiction in
term. The term“law enforcement” is defined as“detection and
punishment of violations of the law.”1 In plain words, the concept
of law enforcement is marked by a vertical relationship between
the sovereign state and the individual. Therefore, law enforce-
ment can take place only within the territory of the sovereign state
from which the authority is granted.2 Accordingly, law enforce-
ment jurisdiction is traditionally and conventionally accepted to
be by nature limited within territorial borders.
In contrast, the term “extraterritorial” means “beyond the geo-
graphic limits of a particular jurisdiction.”3 This term implies that
a state may exercise its jurisdiction outside of its territory. Specif-
ically, this type of jurisdiction is the jurisdiction over persons,
property, or activities that have no territorial nexus whatsoever
with the state that attempts to regulate them. This is sometimes
conceptualized as the nationality principle, the passive personality
principle, the protective principle, and the universality principle
and permitted in particular cases by international law. Yet, the
firmest and the most fundamental principle remains still the terri-
torial principle.
This dichotomy between extraterritoriality and law enforce-
ment is a significant burden to local enforcement authorities in
two respective spheres. Firstly, this conflict is especially stark
when the “local” community is also the very center of global pol-
itics, economy, finance, and tourism, i.e., the very hub of the
entire international society, the“local” law enforcement must be
responsible for policing and securing its local community on the
one hand, and be careful not to obstruct the seamless, constant,
and borderless movement of people, goods, and transportation on
the other. 
Secondly, terrorism itself contains a transnational structure and
background. That is to say, terrorism is a typical example of the
insidiousness of transnational organized crime. It can be plotted
and perpetrated by various and amorphous combinations of com-
manders directing different global and far-flung cells. For
instance, they may have meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, but
make payments in Bangkok, Thailand to accomplish a specific
plot, be trained in a failed state, such as Afghanistan, and flee to a
safe haven, such as Somalia. From examining the travel pattern of
terrorists, it is clear that terrorism is one of the most entwined of
transnational organized crimes. 
Without a doubt, New York City is one such city that is also the
target of this heinous crime. In contrast to the cosmopolitan nature
of the city and terrorism, the New York City Police Department’s
(NYPD) primary responsibility is law enforcement and investiga-
tion within the five boroughs of the city, making it“local”－ i.e.,
distinct from“federal” agencies. Albeit that it is a local authority
that has limits of jurisdiction as other local police departments, it
must also prepare for and respond to transnational terrorist attacks
effectively to shield their city without fail, so it is the veritable
example of the clash between transnationality of terrorism and
territoriality of local law enforcement. 
The NYPD, however, was not necessarily or sufficiently
included in the national intelligence sharing network in the begin-
ning. Nevertheless, terrorist attacks on the city definitely have a
transnational character, as September 11 demonstrated. Thus, the
NYPD, which sacrificed greatly due to its duty as the very first
responder to the attack, established its own International Liaison
Program (ILP) to gather intelligence by itself; the ILP will be
delineated at length later. By sharing timely and appropriate intel-
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ligence with the first responders, law enforcement authorities will
be better able to assess danger and take proper action more
quickly, potentially saving and protecting many lives.4
In this paper, the merits and fruits of having, for the NYPD, its
own foreign liaisons will be scrutinized. The ILP is the embodi-
ment of the NYPD’s eagerness to be proactive, to learn from past
terrorist attacks, and to protect the city and its residents, as the
NYPD itself is veritably one of the many local law enforcement
authorities that are taking on the heavy duty of serving and pro-
tecting their own communities.
I. Local Law Enforcement and Extraterritorial
Anti-Terrorism Measures
A. New York City and Terrorism
Before September 11, one of the main loci of border security,
encompassing travel, entry, and immigration, was the southwest
border in the context of the War on Drugs.5  Now, in the post-Sep-
tember 11 era, border security concerns are not just single
instances of criminal activities such as stowaways or contraband
smuggling any longer. If such relatively-small scaled acts are
committed cross-border or in the supply chain, the more serious
crimes, such as trafficking of terrorists, bombs, weapons, or even
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are also feasible. 
Accordingly, border security is especially important to New
York City, because it serves as the heart of international transpor-
tation. In 2010, 48.7 million tourists, both international and
domestic, visited New York City.6 Its population reached past 8
million in April of 2010.7 The number of foreign-born residents in
the city has doubled since 1970, from 1.4 million then to 2.9 mil-
lion in 2000, and has surpassed 3 million in 2007. Certainly, the
United States, and namely New York City, is an open society that
is trying not to hinder the movement of people while detecting the
few terrorists who are blending in with innocent people. This pol-
icy makes law enforcement authorities' mission excessively chal-
lenging.
Additionally, during 2010, the Port of New York and New Jer-
sey reported that total container traffic in the port was approxi-
mately 5.3 million loaded and unloaded 20-foot equivalent units
(TEUs).8  The port’s total cargo volume by weight in 2008 was
88.9 million metric tons, composed of 55.3 million metric tons in
bulk cargo and 33.6 million metric tons in general cargo.9  Cruise
ships often call at these ports during long journeys. Furthermore,
the bombing of the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 in Yemen not
only awakened the United States government to a sense of vulner-
ability of its 361 ports, but also was epoch-making for New York
City, which itself is an active port; thus, maritime terrorism occur-
ring even outside of the United States still has great significance
to the risk management and threat assessment on the city.
New York City has been, and still is, one of the prime targets
for terrorist attacks, as the City’s history of and ongoing efforts to
combat terrorism testify. It experienced two attacks on the World
Trade Center, with the latter one completely destroying the land-
mark on September 11, 2001. From this tragic incident, the
NYPD learned to prepare for and protect against terrorist attacks.
For instance, an attempted bombing of Times Square was
thwarted by virtue of the effort of law enforcement agencies.
Despite this, it still remains an attractive target to terrorists, espe-
cially on New Year’s Eve.
Terrorist attacks that occur even outside of the United States
but in places similar to New York City cannot be overlooked by
the NYPD because it must gather the relevant needs-to-know
intelligence so that it can formulate its own contingency plans in
attacks with comparable modus operandi. One event that espe-
cially alarmed the NYPD was the Mumbai attack of November
26, 2008, in which ten Islamic terrorists took over and held some
of the guests at the Taj Mahal Hotel and the Oberoi Trident hos-
tage, and shot and killed the passengers at Chhatrapati Shivaji
Terminus.10  Since the heart of New York City also has innumera-
ble hotels as well as transportation hubs such as Pennsylvania Sta-
tion and Grand Central Station, this attack was one possible
worst-case scenario for the city and the NYPD.  Furthermore, the
Madrid train bombing of March 11, 2004 and the London subway
bombing of July 7, 2005 also raised the NYPD’s awareness of the
vulnerability of Amtrak and the citywide subway network.
Incidents like these continue to compel the NYPD to prepare
for and respond to future terrorist attacks. The first responders
never discuss whether any attacks will occur, but when they will
occur, and thus how it will deter and counter them. To be proac-
tive, it demands local law enforcement authorities to be extraterri-
torial.
B. Extraterritorial and Local Law Enforcement
Why is enforcement jurisdiction limited by territory? How
should cross-border enforcement activities be considered? The
issue of how to deal with extraterritorial law enforcement juris-
diction has been resolved by the establishment of the principle of
territoriality in traditional international law theory. Law enforce-
ment jurisdiction is definitely one aspect of sovereignty. States are
conferred this absolute power to govern and regulate all persons
located and activities conducted within their territory. Sovereign
states have the right to legislate their domestic laws to regulate
acts outside of their territory, but they may not exercise the juris-
diction to enforce their laws on foreign soil.
The principle of territoriality grants enforcement jurisdiction to
a sovereign state on offenses that have occurred within or had
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effects on the state.11 The firmest, most fundamental basis for
asserting jurisdiction is this territorial principle. This principle
dictates a state cannot exercise its enforcement jurisdiction on
another state’s territory without the latter’s consent. Thus, law
enforcement jurisdiction is strictly based on the territorial princi-
ple with regards to international law.
II.  Extraterritorial Anti-Terrorism Measures 
Implemented by the NYPD
As examined in the previous section, law enforcement jurisdic-
tion is essentially limited to within territorial borders. The borders
represent the dividing line between jurisdictions of one sovereign
state and another. Law enforcement authorities perceive borders
as the limits of their powers; nonetheless, transnational terrorist
networks span international boundaries.12
This paradox is especially salient in the case of the NYPD. The
NYPD is challenged in that it is not permitted to cross borders,
even within the United States, but simultaneously compelled to go
beyond the antiquated territorial principle of sovereignty. To over-
come this hurdle, the NYPD has adopted a number of counter-ter-
rorism measures that are restricted to federal agencies in
principle, but are implemented by the NYPD as well, given New
York City’s exceptional characteristics. These new measures
might break new grounds in fighting terrorism. 
A. Issues in Information Gathering
On April 11, 2005, the Mayor of New York City, Michael
Bloomberg, signed an executive order that authorized the NYPD
to be in charge in the event of a major catastrophe in the city until
the threat of terrorism is eliminated. The NYPD is empowered to
direct the city’s emergency agencies at the scene of virtually all
potential disasters. With having this new and heavy responsibility,
the NYPD has significant issues with the fact that much of the
needed intelligence is withheld, making its job much more diffi-
cult on the scene even though local officers are the first respond-
ers in such a case.
It is common knowledge, however, that while intelligence shar-
ing is crucial to deter terrorist attacks, it is also a difficult task. It
is an unresolved issue that local law enforcement agencies face a
lack of substantive information needed to prevent terrorism. The
argument about information sharing is stressed on the flow of
intelligence from federal to local for some time. Certainly, the
critical importance of intelligence for frontline police officers
cannot be overstated. Nonetheless, some argue concretely the fea-
sibility to promote interactivity between the local and the federal
by“helping translate national intelligence down to the first
responders and helping pass along detailed local knowledge from
the first responders to the intelligence agencies.”13 Furthermore,
important intelligence that may forewarn of a future attack is col-
lected by local and state government personnel through crime
control and other routine activities and by people living and work-
ing in local communities. 
Regardless of the direction in which intelligence is dissemi-
nated, the common denominator is that local law enforcement
should have comprehensive intelligence, which is a key factor in
preventing terrorist attacks. Thus, local law enforcement entities
hold the view that the axle of homeland security is bolstered by
hometown security, which can only be achieved by the local
police department in the community. For instance, in a hostage
situation, where the hostage takers are members of a transnational
terrorist organization and the hostages include many foreign
nationals, hostage negotiation and rescue missions are primarily
conducted by the local police department, so much information is
needed on the hostage takers, such as their modus operandi,
which determines how the police should respond. If this is not
shared efficiently, the local authority will experience substantial
difficulty in securing the hostages.
Another problem with intelligence sharing is that the intelli-
gence shared by federal or military agencies might not be suitable
to the needs of the local law enforcement authority. That is to say,
even if intelligence sharing could eventually be achieved, there
will still be a gap between what is considered necessary by one
party and useful by another. Oftentimes, the local law enforce-
ment authorities need more precise operational, case-related
information.14 Therefore, it is critical that local law enforcement
authorities obtain unobstructed intelligence fitting to their own
circumstances.
Yet another problem is how local agencies are able to gather
intelligence on their own. Collection of information on foreign
soil for a local police department to accomplish its particular mis-
sion and to protect its hometown is not a simple problem. In the
United States, long-arm laws coping with drug trafficking and ter-
rorism have been enacted to expand extraterritorial jurisdiction.
As a result, there is federal extraterritorial jurisdiction over activi-
ties outside the United States that result in harm within it. Having
such responsibilities, law enforcement agencies have been asked
to accept an ever-expanding role in intelligence gathering, which
is traditionally not within the domain of law enforcement, particu-
larly for local police departments,15 for which traveling abroad on
criminal investigation is a rare occurrence.16  Investigative work
of local police departments is limited to their jurisdiction. In fact,
even under the auspices of the ILP, the NYPD does not engage in
overseas investigation. 
Considering these circumstances surrounding information
gathering, the NYPD’s ingenious milestone program, the ILP, is a
noteworthy example of an extraterritorial anti-terrorism measure
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directly taken by a local law enforcement. It may raise the level of
New York City’s preparedness and vigilance against terrorism.
B. The International Liaison Program
1. Background and Structure
The NYPD had some experience of overseas investigation in
1909. In the first decade of the Twentieth Century, most overseas
investigations of criminal matters fell to local police departments,
which were the most skilled and experienced in investigative
functions.17 Also, in 1983, the NYPD detectives investigated
activities of the Gambino crime family in Kuwait.18 This charac-
teristic aptly reflected the label New York’s Finest, which is“in
many ways the more formidable global investigatory agency.”19
Yet, nowadays, all local police departments face the burden to
respond to transnational terrorism besides their traditional
demands, which are to serve the community by policing and con-
trolling for crimes such as robbery, burglary, domestic violence,
murder, etc. To bridge the discrepancy between the international-
ization of terrorism and the traditional territoriality of law
enforcement, the International Liaison Program (ILP) was born.
The ILP was created by Commissioner of the NYPD, Raymond
Walter Kelly, in 2002.20 This is the result of“a shift in manage-
ment philosophy [within the realm of anti-terrorism policing]
from reactive to proactive”21 in the post-September 11 era.   
However, the NYPD liaison officers do not take part in investi-
gation in any cases of the ILP. Additionally, all of the ILP’s activ-
ities are performed within the territory of a foreign sovereignty on
the condition of the host country’s consent. All the same, the liai-
sons disseminated essential information fitting the needs of the
NYPD.
The ILP’s mission is three-fold. Firstly, it is to uncover any
information pointing to another terrorist attack against New York
City. Secondly, it is to uncover any terrorists or their supporters
residing in the New York metropolitan area. Thirdly, it is to
develop information on the terrorists’ tactics and methods and the
best practices to defeat them. To these ends, the ILP is developing
its own direct relationships with foreign law enforcement agen-
cies for gathering terrorist-related information that is generated
overseas.22
The NYPD has deployed officers in 11 cities in 10 foreign
countries as international liaison officers for the purpose of intel-
ligence gathering.23 They are: London (the United Kingdom),
Lyon and Paris (France), Madrid (Spain), Tel Aviv (Israel),
Amman (Jordan), Abu Dhabi (the United Arab Emirates), Sin-
gapore (Singapore), Toronto and Montreal (Canada), and Santo
Domingo (the Dominican Republic).24 The liaison officers work
with local, national, and international law enforcement agencies
in these cities to carry out the ILP’s mission.
2. The Fruits of the ILP
a. The London Subway Bombing
One of the achievements of the ILP concerned the London Sub-
way Bombing. On July 7, 2005, Islamic fundamentalists deto-
nated four bombs, three of which were in the London
Underground and one was on the deck of a bus, killing 52 people
and injuring more than 700 people. Incidentally, an ILP liaison
officer was taking the Tube at the time of the attacks, and after
consulting with his Scotland Yard counterparts, he was able to
provide details from the scene to the NYPD. This swift informa-
tion-sharing helped the NYPD to redeploy resources quickly in a
way to better protect New York’s subway and streets from any
comparable attacks.
b. The Mumbai Attacks
The next lesson learned was from the Mumbai Attacks in India.
The seriousness of this case as considered by the NYPD was
patently illustrated by the testimony of Police Commissioner
Kelly before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs on January 8, 2009.25
The Mumbai Attacks took place on November 26, 2008, in
which 10 Islamic terrorists took over Taj Mahal Hotel and the
Oberoi Trident and held some of the guests hostage. A simulta-
neous attack on the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus saw some pas-
sengers shot and killed. The attacks signified that the terrorists
were well-trained, despite using rudimentary weaponry such as
AK-47 rifles, pistols, and grenades. They were also mobile as
they came by way of the sea, and were able to maneuver easily
within the complex structures, causing the 175 deaths and injuring
300 people.26
Within hours of the attacks, the NYPD notified the Indian gov-
ernment that it would be sending personnel. On December 2,
three officers from the ILP arrived on the scene. Their assignment
was to gather as much information as possible about the tactics
used, documenting the crime scenes, taking photographs, and
interviewing police officials. From the intelligence collected, the
NYPD gained better awareness of the vulnerabilities of the hotels
in New York City, so it was able to adopt appropriate strategies to
deal with them. 
c. The Jakarta Suicide Bombing
Most recently, on July 17, 2009, two synchronized bomb
attacks at the Ritz Carlton and J. W. Marriott hotels in Jakarta
were perpetrated. The response in New York City was quick,
commencing immediately after the incidents: Within 30 minutes
of the attacks, police cars and officers were deployed by the
NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau (CTB) to the Marriott, the Ritz
Carlton, and dozens of other hotels in New York City.
Again, to gather intelligence on the attacks from the Indonesian
security officials, the NYPD dispatched a lieutenant from its ILP
unit in Singapore to the scene of the bombings, just 8 hours after
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the explosions.  He reported back in real time to the counterterror-
ism division. The timeliness of the information gathered enabled
the NYPD to respond effectively to the terrorist threat and
increase counterterrorism patrols at sensitive locations.
d. Other Significant Cases
In places where there are no official ILP agreements, the
NYPD still cooperated with the local authorities to gather the nec-
essary information. For instance, on March 11, 2004, the Madrid
Railway Bombing took place. An Islamic fundamentalist group
allegedly associated with al-Qaeda detonated 10 backpacks with
explosive devices on 4 commuter trains almost simultaneously in
Madrid, Spain. There were 191 people killed and approximately
1,800 injured. At that time, an NYPD detective was posted there,
so he was dispatched to transmit information back to New York.
After this event, in February 2009, Commissioner Kelly signed
an agreement with the Madrid police officials in New York City
that formalized the ILP between the two departments to thwart
threats of terrorism against both municipalities.
Other than these cities, the NYPD has also dispatched officers
to a number of other locations around the world: an assessment on
a number of al-Qaeda bombings on Jewish synagogues and
HSBC in November 2003 in Istanbul; an analysis on the Metro
blasts by Chechen rebels that killed 39 people in February 2004 in
Moscow; an evaluation on the attacks on Taba Hotel in October
2004 and Sharm el-Sheikh resort in July 2005 in Taba, Egypt; a
review on the radicalization of Hofstad, an Islamist group whose
members murdered the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in
November 2004 in Amsterdam. 
Besides these case-related briefings and intelligence gathering,
the NYPD also had occasions to discuss with foreign services on
security and counter-terrorism matters: meeting with Austrian
intelligence service to review the threat in that country; speaking
with the national police force to share information on the move-
ment of Islamist radical elements in the Philippines; convening
with the Ministry of Interior in Saudi Arabia to assess the radical-
ization in the country; evaluating the emerging presence of radical
elements in Ireland; meeting with the intelligence service in Ham-
burg to understand radicalization trends in Germany.27
As shown in these examples, the operational reaction of the
liaisons and the headquarters differentiates the NYPD from the
intelligence community as a whole in that the ILP gains informa-
tion for the necessary operations in the city, while the intelligence
agencies serve the whole nation.
III.  Needs of Extraterritorial Information 
Gathering by Local Law Enforcement 
A. Terrorists Travel Information
Since September 11, the NYPD has been compelled to adapt to
tackle the new enormous challenge to deter terrorism against New
York City since the attack to which the local police department
must respond is transnationally supported, as the terrorists’ travel
pattern demonstrated.
The investigation of the September 11 attacks demonstrated
saliently al-Qaeda’s astonishing capabilities in international travel
and in recruiting conspirators around the world.28 Hijackers, who
met with the mastermind of the attacks and operatives who were
themselves ex-convicts, entered the United States before Septem-
ber 11. If the authorities had been knowledgeable of the contact
between the operatives and the hijackers, there would be a bigger
chance to capture the hijackers at strategic points since the attacks
were not perpetrated by first offenders only. 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) was the chief engineer of
the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and was also
tasked by Bin Laden to be the mastermind for the September 11
attacks. Mohammad Omar al-Harazi, a.k.a. Abd al Rahim al
Nashiri, was a suspect of the 1998 bombing of the American
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and the mastermind of the USS Cole
bombing on October 12, 2000. He was the leader of al-Qaeda on
the Arabian Peninsula. Both of them recruited operatives for Sep-
tember 11. 
The hijackers for September 11 started training at the Mes
Aynak camp located 25 miles south-east of Kabul in Afghanistan.
Then they moved to Karachi, Pakistan for a week to increase their
familiarity with air travel as well as Western culture. Afterward,
they went to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to obtain further training in
airport security. There, they took a“dry run” to test the security
conditions by boarding the flights with concealed weapons－ box
cutters.
The travel patterns of the pilots and hijackers were very com-
plex, so in order to clearly identify them for this paper, they are
divided in the following four groups:
i. South Tower Team (United Airlines Flight 175). Pilot was
Marwan al Shehhi.
ii. North Tower Team (American Airlines Flight 11). Pilot was
Mohamed Atta.
iii. Pentagon Team (Flight 77). Pilot was Hani Hanjour.
iv. Pittsburg Team (United Airlines Flight 93). Pilot was Ziad Jar-
rah.
In the early stages of preparation for September 11, the move-
ment of Pentagon Team was frequent and active. In January 2000,
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Ramzi Binalshibh (potential pilot),
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Khalid al-Mihdhar (Pentagon Team), Nawaf al-Hazmi (Pentagon
Team), and Tawfiq bin Attash, a.k.a. Khallad (potential pilot) had
a series of meetings.29 (Khallad is often portrayed as having an
artificial right leg, or a “one-legged man”, and Osama bin Laden’s
“run boy.”  He was a conspirator of the US Embassy Bombings in
East Africa in 1998 and helped prepare for the September 11
attacks.)  Mihdhar and Hazmi were the first two al-Qaeda mem-
bers for September 11 to enter the United States through Los
Angeles from Bangkok, Thailand, on January 15, 2000.30
Another cell composed of Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh
(potential pilot), Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah, known as the
“Hamburg Cell” emerged from Hamburg, Germany. Some other
operatives were also recruited in Hamburg, and they traveled to
Afghanistan.31 Then, in 2000, pilots and hijackers started to gather
in the United States. Atta arrived from Prague, the Czech Repub-
lic, to Newark, New Jersey, on June 3, 2000. Marwan al Shehhi
(South Tower Team pilot) arrived from Brussels, Belgium, at
Newark on May 29, 2000. On October 29, Jarrah (Pittsburg Team
Pilot) arrived back in the United States, entering through Tampa,
Florida, from Frankfurt, Germany. He was the most frequent bor-
der crosser, and on January 5, returned from Dusseldorf, Ger-
many, arrived at Newark, New Jersey and flew to Tampa, Florida.
Hani Hanjour (Pentagon Team Pilot) arrived at Cincinnati from
Dubai, the UAE, via Paris on December 8, 2000. 
Finally, in 2001, the entry and movement of operatives became
full-scale. On January 18, Shehhi (South Tower Team Pilot)
arrived at JFK Airport in New York from Casablanca. Jarrah
(Pittsburg Team Pilot) arrived at Atlanta from Amsterdam, Neth-
erland on April 13, 2001. On April 23, 2001, Walleed al Shehri
(North Tower Team) and Satam al Suqami (North Tower Team)
arrived at Orlando from the UAE. Marwan al Shehhi (South
Tower Pilot) finally entered Miami on May 2, 2001. On the same
day, Ahmed al Ghamdi (South Tower Team) and Majed Moqed
(Pentagon Team) arrived at Washington D.C. and took an apart-
ment in Paterson, New Jersey. Mihdhar (Pentagon Team), once
left for Yemen, returned to the United States and joined them in
Paterson. Ahmad al Haznawi (Pittsburg Team) and Wail al Shehri
(North Tower Team) arrived together at Miami from Dubai, UAE
on June 8, 2001. Banihammad (South Tower Team) and Saeed al
Ghamdi (Pittsburg Team) arrived at Orlando from Dubai on June
27, 2001. On June 29, Salem al Hazmi (Pentagon Team) arrived at
JFK Airport in New York from Dubai, UAE. On July 4, Mihdhar
reentered the United States at JFK Airport. Atta finally entered
the United States, Atlanta, from Madrid on July 19, 2001.
In total, these perpetrators successfully entered the United
States 33 out of 34 times, including 11 entries through the New
York area airports and 12 through Florida airports.32 Figure 1 rep-
resents their transnational travel pattern, to which the NYPD had
to respond as the local police department. From the density of the
terrorists’ movements, i. e., the density of the lines that literally
connect the dots, the travel pattern of attackers can be clearly
visualized. Of course, this travel information might seem to be
irrelevant and disjointed as merely dots on the map, the points
must nevertheless be connected to create a mosaic of the terrorist
Fig.1  Travel Pattern of Hijackers
(Source: Esri, i-cubed, USDA, USGS, AEX, GeoEye, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, and the GIS User Community 
| Copyright:  2011 Esri, DeLorme, NAVTEQ, TomTom)
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plot to thwart and prevent impending attacks. Understandably,
this is not an easy task to accomplish, most of all, when the stove-
piped approach divides these relevant sets of information to frag-
mented ones.33 
It has even been suggested that, with the benefit of hindsight, it
seems obvious that the information suggested that the hijackers
received flight instruction and intended to use the aircraft as
weapons but it is realistically difficult with foresight to process
and estimate such raw information into concrete plans of terrorist
attacks.34
Yet, the castigation must not be dismissed as mere hindsight
bias.35 The failure in connecting-the-dots that September 11 raised
will not readily be overcome by information sharing and coordi-
nation among intelligence and law enforcement organizations.36 It
is entangled with the entire process of intelligence; that is to say,
what information should be collected, on which issues, and how
accurately is it processed and disseminated as precise estimation
of threats on specific issues. Answers to these questions result in
drawing a comprehensive picture of the necessary intelligence.
B. Information Gathering and Analysis for the Threat
to New York
1. Information Gathering
As one of the alternatives to traditional intelligence gathering
methods, the ILP is charging ahead on the robust and rapid flow
of intelligence toward extraterritorial policing after September 11.
The most significant advantage in forging foreign liaison relation-
ships is meeting the police department’s need to collect informa-
tion for the specific concerns and interests of the city’s situation.
Since such liaison relationships are carried out on an agency-by-
agency basis,37 they are productive and fitting apparatus of infor-
mation gathering that satisfy the priorities of the NYPD. Because
of a lack of prioritization among the immeasurable issues affect-
ing the precision of all of the phases of anti-terrorism measures,
information gathering turns into information hoarding, i. e.,
assembling unrelated pieces that cannot be put together into a
complete jigsaw puzzle in the end. Thus, the prioritization of the
intelligence gathered by the ILP in terms of its significance and
relevance to the city has a considerably beneficial impact on the
swiftness of the NYPD’s responsive actions.
Certainly, priority of issue is assessed by taking into account of
many indeterminate elements that are interconnected with one
another, such as subjects (terrorist groups), acts (crimes), geogra-
phy (location), etc, so there are important questions to ask about
what kind of intelligence is helpful. For instance, does New York
City require the information regarding WMD proliferation via
commercial cargo? If it is improbable that WMD’s will be used
against the city, should the liaison give them less priority? How-
ever, if it is possible to imagine that even a trifle stowaway can
come through the Port of New York and New Jersey, is it not pru-
dent to assume WMD’s can as well? Questions like these can
expand infinitely and will not necessarily lead the police to “crush
the cell”,38 but squash the first preventers and responders in their
weight. Therefore, prioritization of issues is indispensable.
An admonishment of having foreign liaison relationships or
creating of new intelligence units is that they will need to be
accommodated within the already-crowded existing intelligence
community to avoid duplication.39 Nevertheless, the purposes of
various information collectors are different depending on the
agencies that send them. For instance, the military presence in
Afghanistan does not involve mainly in counter-narcotics activi-
ties.40 On the other hand, diplomats observe and report the whole
of the political reality of the host country.41 Clearly, these two
bodies serve their own purposes without much overlap. There-
fore, it is vital for the NYPD to have its own international liaisons
collecting and handling intelligence pertinent to the city. It does
not have a duplicate function from the point of view of the NYPD,
but is tailored to the specific aims of the department.
Another criticism of the program is that foreign liaisons depend
on their foreign counterparts so that the quality of the shared
information between them is dependent on the efficiency and pro-
ficiency of the host agency, which influence the reliability and
assessment of the intelligence. While this is true, this is not a flaw
of the ILP itself. As embassy personnel also collect information
primarily from the people in the host state, this argument would
apply to them as well. Would anyone suggest that the intelligence
function of an embassy is of poor quality because of the method
of collecting?42 
In short, the ILP suits the particular operational needs of the
NYPD by establishing a clear sense of priority in its collection of
intelligence.  
2. Intelligence Analysis
Intelligence analysis is the foundation of the process of intelli-
gence.43 Namely, issues of confidence levels of estimation, indica-
tions, and warnings are worthy to mention from the perspective of
local law enforcement.
Concerning confidence level, even though no one can assert
that an attack will occur at specific time and location, it is fair to
say that analytical pusillanimity must be avoided. In other words,
intelligence analysts must have certain level of confidence in their
analysis. Wording such as “a small but significant chance of
something happening”44 is a notorious example of this.
Regarding indications and warnings, they are close to careful
police work in that they look out cautiously for something that is
wrong.45 Therefore, the ILP shows itself at its best in this sort of
work by gathering clues and hints on possible attacks from for-
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eign sources. This type of intelligence gives clear guidance to the
police operation as red flags. 
In contrast, if color-coded Homeland Security Advisory Sys-
tem (HSAS) inured the public to red (severe risk of terrorist
attacks) or orange (high risk of terrorist attacks) level of warning,
they will become indifferent to the difference between red,
orange, yellow, blue, or green. This would render the system use-
less. One of the most significant raison d’être of intelligence is to
warn and prepare the entire nation for any impending attacks.
Thus, not having any clarity in its indication and warning will
result in a decrease of its effectiveness.
The mandatory requirements on the intelligence for New York
City are that information must be on the specific issue, assessment
of information must be accurate, indication of threats and their
warnings must be precise so that there could be speedy and effi-
cient mitigation, preparation, and response. All of them are the
nuclei of anti-terrorism measures. 
Nevertheless, even when the typical terrorist attacks are sub-
way bombing, suicide bombing, and hostage taking, the main
locus of New York’ security, the interconnection among broader
issues, must not be ignored. As a major port city, New York is a
target of water-borne attacks, as Commissioner Kelly’s taking
notice of the attackers of the Mumbai Attacks approaching from
the water shows. Additionally, it has recently been reported that
al-Qaeda is planning to erect an underwater diving capability.46 To
prevent any potential attacks in this manner, the NYPD’s harbor
officers have authority to board any ships that enter the port and
its divers inspect the piers and hulls of vessels for underwater
explosive devices. 
Violent groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, once thought to
be active only in the Middle East, have emerged within the United
States and established fundraising, recruiting, and indoctrination
centers throughout the country. Furthermore, they are financed by
profits from drug trafficking into and out of the United States.47
Therefore, narco-terrorism is also on the watch list of the NYPD,
which tracks the money movement for deterring money launder-
ing and terrorist financing.
Even maritime piracy should not be ignored but regarded as a
benchmark of terrorism. The International Criminal Police Orga-
nization (INTERPOL) attaches vital importance to the role of
police investigation in tracking financial transactions and estab-
lishing links with other types of crime benefitting from piracy,
such as terrorism.48 For instance, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),
an Islamist movement in the Philippines, has used piratical meth-
ods to raise money.49 Yet, so far, the relationship between criminal
organizations including terrorists and piracy is not a general trend
for maritime security.50 From perspective of port and supply-chain
security, the Port of New York and New Jersey is a high value tar-
get. The vulnerability of port security and maritime logistics is
untested, but the terrorism-related risks should be enumerated. A
detonation of explosive devices in port or on board ships loaded
with liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),
or crude oil, is an attractive plan for terrorists. The collateral dam-
age incurred should not be underestimated, either. The narrow,
shallow, and crowded courses in the port create a maritime choke-
point so that the explosion, debris, and pollution by a terrorist
attack can be quite disastrous.
For the sake of New York City’s, these threats should be judged
by the information that is collected globally through the eyes,
ears, and with the long-arms of the NYPD.
Conclusion
Terrorist attacks could occur in any local community. In con-
trast to their venues of attack, terrorist networks and cells that
support those catastrophic and traumatic attacks are expanding
around the world, crossing borders, and traveling internationally.
Any local police department that is assigned the crucial task of
protecting its hometown must accomplish its duty within its juris-
diction as first preventers and responders.
To prepare for and respond to these threats arisen from transna-
tional terrorist organizations, local law enforcement authorities
cannot be indifferent to information gathering on foreign soil. The
ILP of the NYPD is an epoch-making program as an extraterrito-
rial anti-terrorism measure implemented by local police depart-
ment.   
On the other hand, the ILP must surmount commonly unre-
solved issues faced by other parties within the intelligence com-
munity. These issues are intertwined and they concern sharing
information, connecting the dots, and issuing appropriate warn-
ing. Firstly, the accuracy and certainty of the shared information
depend on the sources and analysis of host agencies. If the host
agency depends on second-rate information, international liaison
is not a reliable way of intelligence gathering. Secondly, when the
dots are not connected adequately, threat judgment will not be
trust-worthy.51 On the other hand, if the analysts make too many
links among the dots, they might depict a false picture and overre-
act.52 When the local law enforcement authorities are drowned in
the flood of information, they will suffer from“threat fatigue”53
that decreases sensitivity to the risks, which facilitates overlook-
ing a Trojan horse.54 If they receive intelligence that all of the
facilities in the city are under imminent threat, they will not be
able to effectively safeguard the city. 
Therefore, the problem that now confronts the ILP is how the
liaisons should collect the information, how the information
should be processed, how the analysts should evaluate the threats
to New York, and how the NYPD should formulate anti-terrorism
measures in New York City. This is not an inherent problem of the
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ILP, but a common one for the intelligence function. If the appro-
priate and desirable intelligence cannot be defined, in other
words, if there are no silver bullets,55 the bottom line is that the
would-be proficient liaison will come to find it by seeing, hearing,
and assembling together ostensibly unrelated pieces of informa-
tion in order to prevent the next attack that might loom ahead for
New York City. 
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ニューヨーク市警察のテロ対策
大河内　美香
（東京海洋大学海洋科学部海洋政策文化学科）
要旨：　2001年 9月 11日に発生した米国同時多発テロ以後、従来、地域の安全に第一義的な責務を負っ
てきたニューヨーク市警察（NYPD）は、国境を越えるネットワークに支えられたテロリズムに対応する
ための準備を整えてきた。NYPD のこうした特筆すべき各種テロ対策のうち、情報収集のための連絡官
（リエゾン・オフィサー）を国外の拠点に配置することを可能にしたインターナショナル・リエゾン・プ
ログラム（ILP）は、市警察の管轄を越えた情報収集及びテロ対策として有益であるため本稿で紹介する。
キーワード：　域外法執行、市警察、管轄権、テロリズム
